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Abstract
Motive Internalism, in meta-ethics, is the position that if an agent
sincerely makes moral judgments, the judgments are purely belief and
themselves motivate the agent to take the necessary actions. As
neuroscience concerning moral judgments advances, we are permitted to
consider this meta-ethical topic with empirical facts. Cases of patients
who have damage to the ventro-medial frontal area of the brain, are just
one example, and some argue that these cases disprove Motive
Internalism. However, this argument is found to be based on
misinterpretations of Motive Internalism and in this paper I will offer the
proper interpretation by considering the "inverted-commas" use of moral
judgments. I will argue the interpretations of the neural basis of Motive
Internalism.
Introduction
As neuroscience advances, many ethical problems have arisen and
Neuroethics has attracted a lot of attention. Neuroethics is the field that
looks into these problems and many conferences have been held around
the world.
Roskies categorized this neuroethics into "ethics of neuroscience" and
"neuroscience of ethics". The former addresses practical ethical problems
in applying neuroscience and the latter addresses theoretical ethical
problems which have arisen from the knowledge of neuroscience.
In this paper, I will consider motive internalism in the latter sense. As
neuroscience has gradually revealed scientific features of moral
judgments, we can consider morality in metaethics with such empirical
facts. We have to care to interpret these meta-ethical positions and I will
offer some interpretations.
Firstly, I will clarify Motive Internalism and the concept of moral
judgment and motivation. Next, I will review some neuroscience studies
concerning moral judgments and present arguments against motive
internalism. Finally, I will discuss the misinterpretation of motive
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internalism and then offer proper interpretations by comparing moral
judgments and inverted-commas use of the judgments.
1. Motive Internalism
Internalism in metaethics has been basically taken as the view that
moral judgments have a necessary and internal connection with the reason
for, or the motivation for, the act to which the judgments refer. The issue
of the connection between moral judgments and motivation is important
in metaethics. However, there are various opinions to this problem and
various types of internalism (Mele, 1996, p.728; Brink, 1989, p.38). Brink
classified internalism into reason internalism and motive internalism
(Brink, 1989, p39). In this paper I will discuss the latter.
Smith wrote that;
In metaethics, we are concerned not with questions which are the
province of normative ethics like Should I give to famine relief?'
or ' Should I return the wallet I found in the street?' but with
questions about questions like these." (Smith, 1994, p.2)
That is, what is considered in metaethics, is not which act is good or
right, or what are the best normative theories, but what it means for us to
suggest or accept some norm or what is the nature of ethical properties
and moral evaluation itself. The term "moral judgments" in this paper,
does not describe judgment in accordance with normative theories, but
first-person moral judgments, which an agent makes sincerely. These
moral judgments are typically made in the linguistic and conscious
process.
Our acts are generally based on moral judgments. We sometimes state
moral judgments to others in order to make them act or persuade them not
to act. When we do something like this, we assume that moral judgments
have such a force. It seems that moral judgments have a practical aspect
and have close connections to an act. Moral judgments are made to
provide an answer to a question about what should be done, and to serve
as a guide to actions. This function of guiding actions is called
motivation. Thus, if moral judgments, which an agent makes, have the
function of guiding action, the agent is motivated to act in making the
moral judgment.
Although there are various positions as to the connection between
moral judgments and motivation, these positions are basically taken in
Motive Internalism in Neuroethics 79
order to answer the following two almost identical questions. One is
whether we need to refer to motivation in analyzing the nature of moral
judgments in the first place, and the other is what kind of relation moral
judgments have with the motivation. Motive internalists argue that it is
important to refer to motivation, and that moral judgments have a
necessary and internal connection with motivation. In other words, they
insist that when an agent makes moral judgments, the person is actively
motivated to take the action to which the judgments refer only by the
judgment.
On the other hand, motive externalists argue that there is no need for
referring to motivation, and that moral judgments have contingent and
external connections with motivation. "Contingent and external
connections" means that even if moral judgments motivate agents to act,
they are not necessarily connected and the appearance is a
psychologically contingent fact. They consider that what, in fact,
motivates the agent is something other than moral judgments.
The motivation which motive internalists insist on. may need to be
further clarified. Although this motivation is the motivation of taking the
action to which moral judgments refer, they do not insist that the agents
have other external motivations, that is, motivations to which the moral
judgments do not refer. It is possible for agents to fail to take an action to
which a moral judgment refers because of weakness of will,
psychological disabilities and so on. In other words, they insist that moral
judgments can provide one source of motivation (McNaughton, 1988,
p. 118, p. 134). What they insist on is not a necessary and internal
connection between moral judgment and an act, but between moral
judgment and the motivation. If other motivations are weaker or lacking,
the agent takes the action to which the moral judgment refers. In addition,
they actually take the action "when in a particular case someone is (or
perhaps merely believes that he is) morally required to do something"
(Nagel, 1970, p.7).
A division remains within this motive internalism over the nature of
moral judgments. What Smith calls 'the moral problem' is helpful in
seeing this division. Smith wrote that "the moral problem is, in fact, the
central organizing problem in contemporary metaethics" and "it explains
the massive disagreements that exist among philosophers about
metaethical issues"(Smith, 1994, p.12). The following three propositions,
quoted from his book, are inconsistent.
1 Moral judgments of the form 'It is right that (J)' expresses a
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subject' s beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about
what is right for her to do [cognitivismj.
2 If someone judges that it is right that she (j) s then, ceteris
paribus, she is motivated to (/) |motive internalism).
3 An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has
an appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and
desire are, in Hume' s terms, distinct existences! Humeanism] .
(Smith, 1994, p. 12)
According to Humeanism, beliefs only describe the world but are
themselves not able to motivate an agent to take actions. On the other
hand, desires have a function of motivation and are able to motivate an
agent to take actions only by means-end beliefs.
Although each of these positions has been convincing, we cannot take
all of them together. There are also two positions in motive internalism.
One rejects cognitivism, and the other rejects humeanism. However, the
term motive internalism is often used to refer to the latter, which is the
concept followed in this paper.
2. Motive Internalism and Neuroscience
Recently, many neuroscientists have carried out various studies
regarding moral judgments. Studies about the ventromedial (VM) cortex
are considered to be especially wedded to moral judgments. Damasio is
one well-known researcher in this area of research. Damasio and his
colleagues did many studies with patients who have damage to the
ventromedial frontal area of the brain. The VM cortex is considered to
have relevance to the control of reason and emotion. Although functional
localization in the VM area has not been described yet, the effects of
disabilities in that area are critical and noteworthy.
Phincas Gage is one of the most famous patients who had VM cortex
damage. After a spear-like tamping iron injured his brain in an explosion
accident in 1848, his personality changed from a trusting and respectable
to an antisocial one. Although Gage' s case was reported by the doctor
who treated him, it went largely unnoticed until recently. The autopsy
date is unknown and his brain was not preserved, therefore, researchers do
not have clues as to exactly which area in the brain he might have been
damaged, thereby, relate this to his symptoms. However, Damasio and his
colleagues recreated his brain and penetration of the tamping iron with 3D
computer graphics, and they pointed out that the area where his brain was
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damaged was the VM area (Damasio et al, 1994).
Damasio and his colleagues have also studied many other patients with
damaged VM cortises and the case of EVR (he), especially, is worth
mentioning. His personality also changed after VM area damage.
Damasio and his colleagues conducted various tests with EVR, for
example, psychological tests, and the results indicated that he was quite
normal in terms of perception, memory, learning ability, attention and
calculation. In addition to these tests, some tests measuring social
convention and moral valuation and similar , were also carried out.
Roskies insists that the cases of VM patients disprove claims of motive
internalism. She summarizes the results of these studies as seen below
(Roskies, 2003, p.57).
(1) VM patients are able to make appropriate moral and social
judgments when queried. When presented with hypothetical
situations, the conclusions they reach about moral questions
concur with those which normals typically reach.
Psychological evaluation shows that some VM subjects attain
the highest level of abstract moral reasoning.
(2) Clinical histories and observation suggest that VM patients are
impaired in their ability to act effectively in many moral
situations.
(3) Normal subjects produce a skin-conductance response (SCR)
to emotionally-charged or value-laden stimuli. In contrast, VM
patients do not generally produce SCRs when presented with
such stimuli. However, other tests produce normal SCRs in
VM patients, demonstrating that the autonomic nervous
system itself is undamaged.
(4) VM patients display and report attenuated or absence of affect
when faced with situations that reliably elicit emotions in
normals.
In addition to this, she interprets SCR as evidence of the presence of
motivation, and she considers that lack of it means absence of motivation.
The SCR is considered to be a reliable indicator of motivation for action
in neuroscience studies. Her conclusion is that normalcy of making moral
judgments and lack of motivation "show that VM patients are
counterexamples to the claim that there is a necessary connection between
moral beliefs and motivation" (Roskies, 2003, p.59).
For the purpose of this paper, I will agree with her that VM patients
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lack motivation. However, this is a misinterpretation of motive
internalism. Whether her interpretation of motive internalism is right or
not requires further consideration.
3. Neural bases of Motive internalism
We cannot simply refute Roskies' s argument on the grounds that she
used agents with disability as the basis of the argument. It is certain that
"a normal agent is hard to define without resorting to statistical means, or
without some understanding of the biological function of ethical
reasoning". And "we must take care not to beg the question and define
normalcy to be ' motivated to act according to one' s moral judgment' "
(Roskies, 2003, p61).
However, it is important to find out whether the neural bases which
motive internalism originally premise, are functioning properly. As long
as we identify our mental activities as natural properties, motive
internalists' position on moral judgment means that there are certain
types of neural bases which bear such functions. For example, the
statement that human beings are able to see X-rays without any artificial
devices means that humans have a certain type of neural bases for such an
ability.
Therefore, if VM patients have disabilities in such neural bases, it is
natural that they are not consistent with motive internalism. Motive
internalists assume normalcy of such neural bases and do not insist that
they are able to hold their position in the case of agents who have
disabilities in such neural bases. It follows then, that to disprove motive
internalism with empirical evidence is to prove that there are no neural
bases which bear such function as motive internalists claim.
From this point, we can say that Roskie' s argument depends on how
she interprets neural bases, and that clarifying the neural bases which are
disproved by the VM patient' s case is necessary and sufficient to confirm
her interpretation.
The evidence that she uses in her argument is obtained from research
on patients with disabilities. Based on that alone, we cannot conclude that
VM patients disprove the existence of VM area function. When a person
loses a function through damage to some area, we generally consider that
there is a possibility that area controls the function.
The function which the VM area might have is suggested by EVR' s
symptoms. One of the most remarkable symptoms is that in spite of his
normal cognitive function, knowledge, reasoning and so on, he couldn' (
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use these abilities in a practical way. According to this, there is a
possibility that VM patients have a disability in the neural base
concerning, at least part of, motivation and the neural base is isolated
from the neural bases which bear the function of making VM moral
judgments (Moral statements by VM patients are called VM moral
judgments for ease of clarity).
Therefore, we cannot disprove the existence of these neural bases. This
is the basis of her interpretation. As long as she considers that VM
patients are counter-example to motive internalism, it means that she
believes the neural base which bears the function of VM moral judgment
cannot be isolated from the one which bears the function of motivation.
What we have to consider is whether this interpretation is appropriate or
not.
As far as I know, motive internalists have not referred to the
presumption of neural bases, however, we can presume they did, from
ideas concerning moral judgments. As has already been stated, motive
internalism in this paper takes cognitivism and moral judgments to have
both functions of belief and motivation. However, motive internalists do
not insist that all beliefs and judgments necessarily motivate to take the
action to which the judgments refer to, for example, when we solve a
mathematical problem, there is no motivation to take the action to which
the belief refers.
If an agent does not sincerely make moral judgments, the judgments
are not moral judgments in the precise meaning of the term and the
judgments do not also necessarily motivate the agent. For example,
recalling and repeating other peoples' opinions or conventional
expressions. In this case, it is more accurate to express that 'the person
says "it is right to 0" '. This has been called the inverted-commas use
(Hare, 1956, p. 124). Although Hare is not a cognitivist, motive
internalists who take cognitivism agree with him on this. (McNaughton,
1988, p. 137).
I will compare the moral judgments and inverted-commas use of the
judgments from the viewpoint of neural bases. As previously mentioned,
while moral judgments have functions of belief and motivation, inverted-
commas use of the judgments has only the function of belief. The
difference between them is the function of motivation to take action, but
their formation and meaning are identical. That means moral judgments
are composed of the inverted-commas use of moral judgments with the
additional function of motivation. In other words, moral judgments can be
said to be inverted-commas use of the judgments in cases of lack of
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motivation to which the judgments refer, and the function of motivation
can be isolated from the function of inverted-commas use of the judgment.
Of course, it is possible for a neural base to bear several functions since
a sequence of neural bases corresponds to a specific function. However
new functions can be added, and arc possible, because of the intervention
of other sequences of neural bases. Therefore, the function of motivation
is borne by a sequence of neural bases which is different and isolated
from the function of belief. The neural bases, presumed by motive
internalism, can be interpreted like this.
If such an interpretation is true, there is a possibility that VM moral
judgments are different from moral judgments that motivation internalists
insist on. Even if VM patients apparently make and state moral judgments
in appropriate situations, these judgments cannot be called moral
judgments from the motive internalist' s viewpoint as long as the patients
have damaged neural bases, which motive internalists premise. There is a
possibility that they cannot sincerely make moral judgments in a precise
sense and their judgments are "inverted-commas use of judgment" .
Some may consider that my interpretation is inconsistent with internal
connections and intrinsicness which motive internalists claim, however,
there are no good reasons to take such interpretations, like Roskies, as
substantive positions. The problem with Roskie' s position is that if
motive internalists premise additional and isolable neural bases, there is
no difference between other moral judgments and beliefs or inverted-
commas use of moral judgments, in the case of motivation, meaning that
all beliefs have the function of motivation. However, almost every motive
internalist denies this idea and it is difficult to call it substantive motive
internalism.
The basic idea of motive internalism is that the agent who sincerely
makes moral judgments is necessarily motivated to take the action to
which the judgment refers only by the judgment. This means that, as long
as we meet the conditions necessary for motive internalism, any
interpretation of neural bases we take, causes no problem.
Conclusion
In this paper, I looked into motive internalism, which is one of
metaethical positions and offered a proper interpretation, that is, motive
internalists premise that the function of motivation is borne by a sequence
of neural bases which is different and isolated from belief. As long as we
identify our mental activities as natural, it is necessary to consider
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metaethical problems with empirical facts. We have to pay attention to
what each metaethical position premises and to interpret them properly in
doing so.
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